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When tax collectors become collectors for child support and student loans: Jeopardizing the 
revenue base? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tax authorities are increasingly becoming involved in the administration of social policy 
(Vehorn and Brondolo 1999). At times this involves making payments to segments of the 
population who need assistance, but at other times, tax offices assume the less popular 
responsibility of collecting money, as in the case of child support or student loans. There 
have been suggestions that unpaid civil and criminal penalties are also potentially 
collectible through the tax system. Such developments provide an efficient solution to 
serious compliance problems in the community. The tax office can extract payments along 
with income tax at source for wage and salary earners, or issue tax assessments that take 
account of money owed to other branches of government. While administrators dwell on 
the logistics of such schemes and policy makers estimate the additional dollars brought 
into the system, tax researchers need to ask the question, how does such policy impact on 
the efforts of tax authorities to promote a voluntary taxpaying culture? Finding ways to 
promote a voluntary taxpaying culture has emerged as a priority for countries that rely on a 
self-assessment tax system (James and Alley 1999). As James and Alley point out (1999), 
when tax systems are used as instruments of policy, compliance changes in meaning: It is 
no longer “just compliance with tax law” but “compliance with government policy in the 
wider sense” (p. 9). This paper investigates the relationship between making payments 
through the tax office for extra items such as higher education and child support, and 
complying with tax law when completing one’s income tax return. 
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 The paper is divided into 6 sections. The next section presents an argument for why 
making additional payments through the tax office might affect the way in which key 
variables impact on tax compliance, and furthermore, affect compliance directly. Section 
III then briefly reviews the tax compliance literature, justifying the key variables for 
inclusion in this study of taxation compliance, and sets out the research hypotheses. 
Section IV outlines the survey design and describes the measures used to test the 
hypotheses. Section V presents the results of the regression analyses, and the conclusions 
are in Section VI. 
II. MAKING ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS THROUGH THE TAX OFFICE 
The payment of child support and the repayment of a government loan for higher education 
both represent additional payments made by some Australian citizens through the 
Australian federal tax system. It is important to note that the two government programs 
being considered here, the Child Support Scheme (CSS)1 and the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS) are not directly associated with taxation. The reason that the 
taxation authority became involved in collection was implementation efficiency. The 
contribution that individuals make under each scheme is income-dependent, and the tax 
records provide the best data base for assessing level of payment required. 
Both the HECS and CSS were politically controversial when introduced and remain 
so. They were a means of shifting costs from the Australian government to individuals who 
were beneficiaries (in the case of higher education) and who were responsible for sharing 
in the costs (non-custodial parents in the case of child support). In the 1970’s, the 
                                                 
1 In 1998, the Child Support Agency was organizationally transferred to the Department of Family and 
Community Services. Nevertheless, the Agency continues to be located within the tax authority so that data 
can be shared on child support cases. 
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Australian government provided free tertiary education and support for children from 
broken homes. Policy changes that shifted the costs of education and family maintenance 
from government to individuals therefore threatened the established state-citizen 
relationship (Chapman and Ryan 2002; Joint Select Committee on Certain Family Law 
Issues 1994; for more on disillusionment with Australian democracy, see Rawlings and 
Braithwaite 2003).  
Many individuals caught up in making payments through the HECS and CSS are 
resentful at being caught in this web: They see themselves as the “unlucky” ones, paying 
their way twice – first paying for particular kinds of services that others have had free of 
charge, and second, paying the same amount that others do into the communal pot for the 
benefit of all (Ahmed 2003; Sutton 1996). Furthermore, research supported by the 
Australian Taxation Office suggests that the HECS and CSS have tested the authority’s bid 
to improve the voluntary taxpaying culture in Australia (Australian Taxation Office 2002-
03; Blaker et al. 2000; Williams 2001).  
The HECS: In 1989, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme was introduced by 
the Australian federal government to assist students who were pursuing tertiary education 
and could not afford to pay fees prior to enrolling in their course of study 
(http://www.hecs.gov.au). The scheme allows tertiary students to accumulate a debt, 
repayable through the tax system once the student enters the workforce and earns more 
than a certain amount per year.  At the time of this research, repayments were not required 
until a person earned more than $21,985. The rate of repayment of the loan increased from 
3% to 6% (based on salary) with the highest rate coming into effect when personal income 
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exceeded $39,5732.  This income range mapped onto the same tax bracket ($20,000 to 
$50,000, marginal tax rate 30%). Income tax is paid independently of HECS and CSS3. 
The CSS: In 1988, the Child Support Scheme was introduced by the Australian 
Government amidst concern that non-custodial parents were failing to provide financial 
support for their children and were relying instead on the government’s social welfare 
system. The purpose of the CSS was to ensure that “parents share in the cost of supporting 
their children according to their capacity” [and] “adequate support is available to all 
children not living with both parents” (www.csa.gov.au/agency/plans). The payment 
formula is complex, taking into account not only the income of the non-custodial parent, 
but also the number of children, and the personal income of the custodial parent.  
It is of note that not all parents choose to use the government as an intermediary for 
child support payments. It is possible, and indeed encouraged by the Child Support 
Agency, for non-custodial parents to make their support payment directly to their family. 
This system, however, operates within a policy framework that allows the custodial parent 
to request intervention by the Agency if the payment is not received or if it is inadequate. 
In this sense, the government remains a player in child support, although its role can be 
indirect as an “overseer” that things are working as they should. 
 Both the HECS and CSS affect wage and salary earners in a similar way. 
Employers deduct any HECS payment or CSS payment through the payroll system along 
                                                 
2 The income thresholds and HECS repayment rates for income earned during the 1999-2000 income year are: 
0% for income below AU$21,984, 3.0% for AU$21,984 - AU$23,183, 3.5% for AU$23,184 - AU$24,982, 
4.0% for AU$24,983 - AU$28,980, 4.5% for AU$28,981 - AU$34,976, 5.0% for AU$34,977 - AU$36,814, 
5.5% for AU$36,815 - AU$39,572, and 6.0% for AU$39,573 and above (http://www.hecs.gov.au/faqs.htm). 
3 The individual tax rates during the 2002-2003 income year are as follows: 0% for taxable income of AU$0 - 
AU$6,000, 17% for AU$6,001 - AU$20,000, 30% for AU$20,001 - AU$50,000, 42% for AU$50,001 - 
AU$60,000, and 47% for over AU$60,000. 
 5
with other compulsory payments such as income tax. Those who do not have the money 
they owe deducted automatically through a workplace payroll system are required to make 
special payments through the tax office (Ahmed 2000). In this respect, economists may 
argue that those involved in making HECS and CSS payments are, in effect, paying higher 
marginal tax rates. If this is the case, there is not a strong argument for predicting a follow-
on effect in the form of increased tax evasion, at least not from empirical research (for a 
review, see Andreoni et al. 1998; Jackson and Milliron 1986)4. As we show in the next 
section, perceptions of events surrounding taxpaying are considerably more important in 
explaining individuals’ non-compliance than the actual events themselves. Whether or not 
individuals perceive additional payments as an increase in their marginal tax rates remains 
untested at this point in time. Depending on how the payment is framed, individuals may 
interpret HECS or CSS contributions as a ‘marginal burden’ imposed by the state, or 
alternatively as a debt or a living expense that has to be paid anyway. In the latter case, 
situational variables are likely to shape judgments about payment, particularly judgments 
about whether the payment represents value for money or not. In survey work with new 
graduates, Ahmed (2003) has found that tax cheating increases among those who were 
dissatisfied with their tertiary education. While the notion of resentment over HECS and 
CSS frames the approach taken in this paper, there nevertheless remains a need for further 
research to test the empirical robustness of a marginal tax rate argument. Needless to say, 
these arguments are not mutually exclusive.  
 
                                                 
4 Typically, experimental studies have produced results showing an association between higher tax rates and 
higher tax evasion. Such a notion of positive association, however, has not been consistently supported in 
population surveys of this kind.  
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III. BRIEF OVERVIEW – EXPLAINING TAX COMPLIANCE 
Traditionally, tax compliance has been understood in terms of the benefits of successful 
evasion weighed against the risk of detection and punishment (Allingham and Sandmo 
1972). Punishment has been most deeply institutionalized in the tax context through 
systems of fines and penalties (Freiberg 1990), although some researchers have extended 
the deterrence model in the tax area to include social sanctions (Grasmick and Bursik 
1990). A degree of support has been found for the hypothesis that compliance is likely to 
be higher when taxpayers perceive there to be a higher probability of being caught along 
with anticipated adverse consequences (Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Lewis 1982; 
Richardson and Sawyer 2001). 
While deterrence theory continues to be popular as a framework for understanding 
tax compliance, few tax researchers now accept that the fear associated with non-
compliance is sufficient to explain why people pay tax (Alm et al. 1995; Andreoni et al. 
1998; Lewis 1982).  Another influential body of work has pursued the issue of moral 
obligation: People pay tax because they believe it is the right thing to do (Schwartz and 
Orleans 1967; McGraw and Scholz 1991; Richardson and Sawyer 2001). Community 
norms about how one should behave, particularly when internalized as personal norms, are 
likely to constrain taxpayers as they review their taxpaying options (Cullis and Lewis 
1997; Smith and Kinsey 1987; Weigel et al. 1987). Recently, there has been a surge of 
interest in the concept of tax morale (Frey 1997) defined as the “intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes” (Torgler 2003: 5).  Torgler (2003) carried out a series of studies on international 
data sets and concluded that high tax morale is associated with higher levels of tax 
compliance.   
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Associated with high tax morale is the internal regulation provided not only 
through knowing the right thing to do, but also feeling that to do the wrong thing is 
intolerable. Ahmed (2001) has analyzed emotional reactions to wrongdoing and concluded 
that certain responses to shame increase compliance in two ways. First, individuals who 
are able to feel shame and yet refrain from blaming others for their mistakes are more 
likely to link such feelings to their actions. They have not succumbed to the commonly 
encountered path of shame displacement (eg It’s not my fault). Second, individuals who 
move on to engage in shame acknowledgment recognize feelings of guilt, and feel the need 
to take action that makes amends. In this way, shame feelings that represent low 
displacement and high acknowledgment prompt future compliance by boosting moral 
obligation.  
Deterrence and moral obligation supposedly keep taxpayers on the path of 
compliance, but what happens when social change disrupts the relationship between the 
citizen paying the tax and the state collecting the tax? Within the tax compliance literature, 
the perceived fairness of the exchange between citizens and government has emerged as an 
important consideration (Kinsey and Grasmick 1993; Kinsey et al. 1991; Mason and 
Calvin 1984; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Thurman et al. 1984; Richardson and Sawyer 2001; 
Wenzel 2001); as has the reactance of taxpayers who oppose government interference in 
their livelihood (Kirchler 1999). Within the context of fair exchange, Scholz and Lubell 
(1998) have pointed to the importance of trust in government as it relates to taxation 
compliance. They have interpreted trust as a “rough measure of the net benefits from 
governing institutions” (1998: 411). Thus, while sanctions and obligation are constraints in 
keeping people in the tax system doing the right thing, unfairness or a breach of trust may 
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be seen as an instigator of non-compliance (see Weigel et al. 1987).  When government 
behaves in a way that is not in accordance with expectations, citizens can retaliate by 
cheating on the tax system. Levi (1998) has referred to this form of citizen responsiveness 
as contingent consent. 
The idea of fairness in the exchange and contingent consent conjure up images of a 
dynamic relationship between citizens and their government. Trust goes up and down 
depending upon how one side acts towards the other. But can citizens reach a point where 
trust is no longer possible – an irreconcilable breach emerges between the citizen and 
government and its authorities? Braithwaite (1998) describes this state of affairs as the loss 
of belief in trust norms. Trust norms are coherent sets of beliefs that are used to gauge the 
trustworthiness of others. As norms, they are shared by the community: Citizens and 
government authorities know what each needs to do to earn the trust of the other and judge 
each other accordingly. When citizens no longer believe in trust norms in relation to a tax 
authority, that is, when they are of the view that there is nothing that the authority can do 
to establish its trustworthiness, they are less likely to defer to the demands of that authority 
(Braithwaite 2004).  
 
A question 
The question that is being posed in the present research is whether government jeopardizes 
its capacity to collect tax when it changes the rules of engagement with the public.  
Deterrence, moral obligation and trustworthiness are expected “to hold” citizens in the 
system, but will these controlling influences remain in place when new schemes are 
introduced that are controversial and which shift costs from the government coffers to the 
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citizens’ pockets? Research on reactance (Kirschler 1999), defiance (Sherman 1993), and 
neutralization techniques to break free of tax office constraint (Thurman et al. 1984) all 
point to a propensity for taxpayers to hit back at the tax authority when they are 
dissatisfied with the nature of the tax deal. 
Theoretically, asking the tax authority to collect payments on behalf of other 
government functionaries can jeopardize the revenue base in two ways. First, making 
additional payments (specific people pay for specific things on top of their standard tax 
contribution) could be an instigator of non-compliance in its own right, and exert a 
negative influence over and above the constraints that are normally imposed by deterrence, 
moral obligation and trustworthiness (the main effect hypothesis (a)). The rationale for the 
main effect hypothesis is that some people may resent “paying twice” (Ahmed 2003) – 
Paying their tax like every one else so that the government can provide goods and services 
for the benefit of all, and then paying extra for particular goods and services that 
government will no longer provide.  
Second, making additional payments could interact with the constraints of 
deterrence, moral obligation and trustworthiness, reducing effectiveness in each case (the 
interaction hypotheses (b, c and d)). The basis for the interaction hypotheses is that there 
may be a ‘reactance’ point beyond which the constraints of the system no longer work. 
People required to make additional HECS or CSS payments, in effect, place themselves 
psychologically outside the control of the system such that deterrence (hypothesis b), 
moral obligation (hypothesis c) and trustworthiness (hypothesis c) no longer are effective 
in exerting a positive influence on compliance.  
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 Underlying both the main effect and the interaction hypotheses about the way in 
which additional payments might jeopardize the tax base is the following condition that is 
justified in the next section: The additional payments being considered here are those that 
signify departure from the status quo with respect to the government-citizen relationship, 
in particular, a change involving the transfer of costs from the government to the citizen 
without substantive change in income tax rates.  
 Finally, the inclusion of a set of control variables that are known to influence 
taxation compliance (age, sex and personal income: see Jackson and Milliron 1986) 
prompted consideration of the interaction between additional payments and personal 
income. Personal income is a variable that in the past has influenced tax evasion in 
unpredictable ways. In this particular context, we wish to test for a possible interaction: 
Those who make additional payments may be more likely to cheat on their tax when their 
personal income is low. The basis for this hypothesis is contextualized within a series of 
analyses and reports that have been released in Australia, culminating in a parliamentary 
inquiry that has concluded that there are unacceptable levels of financial hardship among 
Australians, particularly those on lower incomes (Senate, Parliament of Australia 2004)5.  
Cheating on tax may be one way in which those with additional payments make ends meet. 
IV. SURVEY DESIGN AND METHOD 
1. The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey 
Between June and December 2000, a national survey was conducted by the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity at the Australian National University (for details see Braithwaite 2001; 
                                                 
5 The Senate Inquiry found that 21% of Australians were surviving on less than $400 per week. The 
minimum wage is $431. 
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Braithwaite et al. 2001). A stratified random sample of 7754 persons was selected from the 
publicly available electoral rolls. A lengthy questionnaire on tax matters was sent to each 
person who had been randomly selected, together with a letter explaining the intent of the 
study and a stamped addressed envelope for the return of the completed questionnaire. 
Two reminder cards were sent at two to three week intervals. After 5 weeks, an identical 
questionnaire was posted to non-respondents, again followed by two reminder cards 
(Details of the methodology of the survey are available in Mearns and Braithwaite 2001). 
 Of the households contacted, 29 per cent completed and returned the survey, 
providing 2040 cases for further analysis. This response rate, while low in absolute terms, 
compares favorably with rates reported for other tax surveys (Pope et al. 1993; Kirchler 
1999; Wallschutzky 1996; Webley et al. 2002). Citizens seem less interested in filling out 
questionnaires related to tax than they are with most other topics. A series of diagnostic 
analyses (see Mearns and Braithwaite 2001) suggested that the sample provided a 
relatively representative cross-section of the views of Australians about their tax system. 
Furthermore, the sample was relatively representative of the population with regard to sex, 
ethnicity, education, age, occupation, and marital status. The biases that were detected 
pointed to an over-representation of those in scribing occupations who would have been 
more comfortable with a detailed response-intense questionnaire, and an under-
representation of younger age groups (18 to 25 years) who traditionally are difficult to 
recruit for self-completion surveys. 
 The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey was designed to yield measures 
of a range of tax behaviours and attitudes through sets of multi-item scales (Braithwaite 
2001). Pychometricians (Cronbach and Meehl 1955; Hinkin and Schriesheim 1989; 
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Nunnally 1976) have long warned of the dangers of assuming that single item measures of 
complex phenomena are reliable or valid. Fluctuations in attention, slight differences in 
interpretations of words, particularly across sub-groups within a population, along with the 
different contexts surrounding people’s taxpaying experiences, means that it is preferable, 
where possible, to use multiple measures of complex phenomenon such as tax evasion, 
moral obligation, trustworthiness, and even deterrence. The method used for assessing the 
internal consistency of multi-item scales described below is to use a principal components 
analysis to check for the unidimensionality of each scale in conjunction with an alpha 
reliability analysis (Robinson et al. 1991). Alpha reliability coefficients are reported to 
indicate how coherent the items of the scale are in representing the concept that is being 
measured. In all cases, the scales described below have been used in other research 
contexts. 
 
2. Measures: Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, tax evasion, was a composite of three scales developed from the 
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey (Braithwaite 2001, 2003).  
The first, under-reporting income, was measured through aggregating responses to the 
following questions: In your 1998-99 income tax return, did you declare none (scored 4), 
some (scored 3), most (scored 2) or all (scored 1) of the following: (a) salary, wages; (b) 
honorariums, allowances, tips, bonuses, director’s fees; (c) eligible termination payments; 
(d) Australian government allowances like Youth Allowance, Austudy, Newstart; (e) 
Australian government pension, superannuation pensions, and other pensions and 
annuities; (f) interest; and (g) dividends. A special category allowed respondents to 
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indicate that no income was received from this source. A response in this category was 
scored the same as declaring all income. The eighth and final item was “As far as you 
know, did you report all the money you earned in your 1998-99 income tax return?” (yes 
scored 1, no scored 2). The correlations between the 8 items were positive and significant, 
suggesting that they were all contributing to the measurement of a common construct, 
under-reporting income. In order to give each measure equal weight in the overall measure, 
each of the 8 scores was standardized before being summed to form an under-reporting 
income score (M = .00, SD = .67, alpha reliability coefficient = .80). 
The second tax evasion measure, engaging in the cash economy was measured by 1 
item, asking respondents if they had worked for cash-in-hand payments in the last 12 
months (no scored 1, yes scored 2). Cash-in-hand was defined for them as cash money that 
tax is not paid on. 6 % of respondents were working in the cash economy. 
The third tax evasion measure, exaggerating deductions, was measured by two 
items: (a) As far as you know, did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in 
your 1998-99 income tax return a lot (scored 5), quite a bit (scored 4), somewhat (scored 
3), a little (scored 2), not at all (scored 1); and (b) Think of the deductions and rebates you 
claimed in your 1998-99 income tax return. Would you say you were absolutely confident 
that they were all legitimate (scored 1), a bit unsure about some of them (scored 2), or 
pretty unsure or haven’t a clue (scored 3). Scores were standardized before being 
aggregated (M = .00, SD = .79, alpha reliability coefficient = .51). 
Scores on the three evasion measures, under-reporting income, engaging in the 
cash economy, and exaggerating deductions correlated positively with each other, ranging 
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from .11 (p < .001) to .35 (p < .001). Following Braithwaite (2003) they were combined 
into one composite tax evasion measure. 
3. Measures: Independent variables 
a. Additional payments: Making payments under the HECS or CSS was assessed using two 
separate questions: (a) Do you pay HECS for yourself? (8% replied yes); and (b) Do you 
pay child support? (4% replied yes). Additional regressions were carried out, predicting tax 
evasion separately with a HECS payment and a CSS payment. Findings revealed that these 
two variables behaved in a comparable way in relation to the dependent variable. Because 
of the small number of respondents making such payments, these two variables were 
combined into one variable in which a payment of at least one kind was scored as 2 (11%) 
and payment of neither kind was scored as 1 (89%).  
b. Deterrence: These measures were based on those used by Varma and Doob (1998) and 
Braithwaite and Makkai (1991) which represented perceptions of the likelihood and 
severity of a set of events occurring as a result of not declaring income (Scenario 1) and 
falsely claiming work deductions (Scenario 2). The events involved the perceived 
likelihood of being caught, the perceived likelihood of sanctioning, and the perceived 
severity of the sanctioning. Details of the measures are given in the Appendix. Following 
Braithwaite and Makkai (1991), one overall deterrence term6 (M = 189.6891; SD = 
104.72) was computed as follows: 
Deterrence = α + (C * Pt * St) + (C * Pp * Sp) + (C * Pct * Sct) + (C * Pcp * Scp) + ε 
where α  = constant 
                                                 
6 The correlation between the deterrence term for Scenario 1 and the deterrence term for Scenario 2 is .74. 
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 C  = likelihood of being caught 
Pt  = likelihood of having to pay tax with interest 
St  = severity of the problem created by having to pay tax with interest 
Pp  = likelihood of having to pay tax with interest + penalty 
Sp  = severity of the problem created by having to pay tax with interest + penalty 
Pct  = likelihood of being taken to court and having to pay tax with interest 
Sct  = severity of the problem created by being taken to court and having to pay tax 
with interest 
Pcp  = likelihood of being taken to court and having to pay tax with interest + 
penalty 
 Scp  = severity of the problem created by being taken to court and having to pay tax 
 with interest + penalty  
 ε  = disturbance (error term) 
c. Personal norm of tax honesty: A three-item scale to measure the personal norm of tax 
honesty was used to capture the belief component of moral obligation (see Braithwaite 
2001; Wenzel in press). Respondents were asked to rate each of the following statements 
on a five-point Likert scale: (a) Do YOU think you should honestly declare cash earnings 
on your tax return; (b) Do YOU think it is acceptable to overstate tax deductions on your 
tax return (reverse score); and (c) Do YOU think working for cash-in-hand payments 
without paying tax is a trivial offence (reverse score). Responses were averaged to produce 
scale scores for each individual (M = 3.65, SD = .73, alpha reliability coefficient = .56). 
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d. Shame displacement and acknowledgment: Ahmed’s scales of shame displacement and 
acknowledgment were used to capture the emotional component of moral obligation (for 
details, Ahmed et al. 2001; Braithwaite 2001). Shame displacement represents an inability 
to manage shame without blaming and hitting out at others and making excuses for what 
has gone wrong. Shame acknowledgment represents adaptive shame management whereby 
a person acknowledges wrongdoing, feels guilt and seeks to make amends. Shame 
acknowledgment is comparable to what is commonly understood by the phrases “feelings 
of guilt” and “feelings of remorse.” 
The shame measures were contextualized by using the deterrence scenarios. After 
answering the deterrence questions described above, first, for not declaring income, and 
second, for falsely claiming work deductions, respondents were asked to imagine how they 
would feel if they had been caught and fined. The shame displacement scale comprised 3 
items: (a) feel angry with the Tax Office; (b) feel bothered by thoughts that you were being 
unfairly treated; and (3) feel that you wanted to get even with the Tax Office (M = 1.87, 
SD = .66, alpha reliability coefficient = .90). The shame acknowledgment scale was 
formed through averaging the four-point Likert scale ratings on the following 9 items: (a) 
feel that you had let down your family; (b) feel ashamed of yourself; (c) feel angry with 
yourself for what you did; (d) feel concerned to put matters right and put it behind you; (e) 
feel that what you had done was wrong; (f) feel bad about the harm and trouble you’d 
caused; (g) feel humiliated; (h) feel embarrassed; and (i) feel guilty (M = 3.06, SD = .81, 
alpha reliability coefficient = .95). 
e. Trustworthiness: The belief that if the tax authority acted in certain ways it could be 
regarded by citizens as trustworthy was measured using the exchange  and communal trust 
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norm scales developed by Braithwaite (Braithwaite 1998, 2004; Braithwaite and Reinhart 
2000). Respondents used a six-point rating scale from not at all important to essential to 
reveal how important it was to them for the tax office to meet these exchange and 
communal standards if they were to be regarded as a trustworthy institution. The six 
exchange trusworthiness criteria were: (a) not take risks; (b) have a proven track record; (c) 
be efficient in its operations; (d) be consistent in its decision making; (e) be accountable 
for its actions; and (f) be predictable in the way it responds to citizens. To compute a score 
on this variable, responses to these six items were averaged (M = 5.02; SD = .75; alpha 
reliability coefficient = .82). The communal trustworthiness scale comprised the following 
8 items: (1) share the goals of the people; (2) be able to anticipate problems in the tax 
system before they arise; (3) keep citizens informed; (4) consult widely with different 
groups; (5) understand the position of taxpayers; (6) treat taxpayers with respect; (7) be on 
top of the games of those who get out of paying tax; and (8) have interest in the well-being 
of ordinary Australians (M = 5.21; SD = .71; alpha reliability coefficient = .88). The 
exchange and commnual trust norm scales were highly correlated (r = .66, p < .001), and 
following Braithwaite (2004), were combined into one composite scale representing belief 
in possible trustworthiness (abbreviated as trustworthiness in Table 1). 
f. Social demographic variables: Three variables were used as controls in the analyses in 
this paper: the respondent’s sex, age, and personal income. Sex and age have consistently 
emerged as correlates of tax evasion with women and older taxpayers being more 
compliant (Jackson and Milliron 1986; Richardson and Sawyer 2001). Findings in relation 
to income have been ambiguous in the literature. In the present context, however, including 
personal income as a control was important because it was the determinant of how much 
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people were required to pay in additional payments, and how much people were required 
to pay was expected to influence their willingness to engage in tax evasion. The focus of 
attention in this paper, however, was not on estimating the dollars evaded as a function of 
size of additional payment (far more detailed information would be required for this kind 
of analysis), but whether or not those making additional payments were involved in tax 
evasion once a set of standard predictors of evasion had been controlled (age, sex, personal 
income, deterrence, moral obligation, trustworthiness). 
In the analyses that follow, male respondents were scored 1 and female respondents 
2. Age was measured in years. Personal income was measured in dollars per year. All data 
are aggregated for statistical analyses. 
 
V. RESULTS 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were used to test the main effect 
hypothesis and the interaction hypotheses. The variables with significant B coefficients 
appear in Table 1.  
 Before describing the regression results, the bi-variate relationships (see Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients in first column of Table 1) are of note in so far as 
they support findings from previous research. Tax evasion was higher for men, younger 
respondents, and those on lower income (as expected in this context).  Tax evasion was 
also less common among those who believed there to be a high probability of being caught 
and who feared the consequences (perceived deterrence), who espoused an honest 
taxpaying ethic (moral obligation), who were disinclined to displace shame and more 
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likely to acknowledge it, and who believed that the tax office could be regarded as 
trustworthy if it behaved in certain ways (trustworthiness). 
Turning to the main effect hypothesis, at the bi-variate level, those making 
additional payments, either through HECS or CSS, were more likely to be evading tax. 
When these variables were included together in an OLS regression model (see 
Model A in Table 1), they continued to perform as they had done in the bi-variate analysis, 
with one exception. Shame acknowledgment was no longer a significant predictor of 
evasion. Further analyses revealed that the importance of shame acknowledgment 
diminished once the personal norm of tax honesty was included in the equation. Shame 
acknowledgment and a personal norm of tax honesty were significantly and positively 
correlated (r = .32, p < .001). 
Model B in Table 1 shows what happens to the regression model with the inclusion 
of a series of interaction terms. These terms were calculated by centering7 scores (the 
actual score minus the mean score; for details, see Cohen and Cohen, 1983) before 
multiplying the variable, making additional payments, by respondents’ income and each of 
the constraint variables: (a) perceived deterrence; (b) personal norm of tax honesty; (c) 
shame management (shame displacement and shame acknowledgment); and (d) 
trustworthiness. As can be seen from Table 1, only 2 of these terms (“making additional 
payments * trustworthiness” and “making additional payments * respondents’ income”) 
appeared significant. Changes in the coefficients associated with other predictors from 
                                                 
7 Centering scores reduces the problem of multicollinearity that often accompanies the inclusion of main 
effects and interaction terms in the same model (see Cohen and Cohen 1983). As centering has no effect on 
the substantive evaluation of the effect of the first predictor variable on the criterion variable at any given 
point of the second predictor variable, using centered scores provides the same overall relation between the 
variables as using actual scores (Cohen and Cohen 1983). 
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Model A to Model B were minimal, demonstrating that all main effects – deterrence, moral 
obligation, possible trustworthiness and additional payments – maintained significant 
relationships in their own right with levels of taxation compliance. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A separate second-order analysis was performed for each significant interaction 
term to diagnose the direction of the interaction effect. In order to graph the significant 
interaction, the variables comprising the interaction term were dichotomized using the 
mean-split method. In this method, respondents are placed either in a low group or a high 
group. When the two dichotomous variables (e.g., making additional payments and 
trustworthiness) are cross-tabulated, respondents become a member of one of these four 
groups: high / high (making additional payments with high trustworthiness), high / low 
(making additional payments with low trustworthiness), low / high (not making additional 
payments with high trustworthiness), and low / low (not making additional payments with 
low trustworthiness). A similar procedure was followed to cross-tabulate the interaction 
term between additional payments and respondents’ income. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show 
the directions of the interactional results for “making additional payments * 
trustworthiness” and “making additional payments * respondents’ income”, respectively.  
The rationale for the hypothesized interaction for trustworthiness was that once the 
expectations regarding taxpaying and service provision were breached through new policy 
initiatives, adversely affected community members would not be constrained by trust 
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norms: They would, in effect, be free of them. The results that were obtained and graphed 
in Figure 1, however, were not consistent with this prediction. Trust norm constraints 
worked reasonably well. Tax evasion increased disproportionately when trust norm 
constraints were not in place and when people were making additional payments. 
The significant interaction involving personal income and additional payments 
conformed to expectations. Lower income earners who were making additional payments 
were engaged in higher levels of tax evasion. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Thus, we have three main findings from this study. First, making additional 
payments through the HECS or CSS is associated with high levels of tax evasion, an effect 
that remains significant even after the control variables (sex, age, personal income) and the 
constraint variables (deterrence, moral obligation, trustworthiness) are entered into the 
equation. The main effect hypothesis is supported. 
 Second, while additional payments clearly create compliance problems for the tax 
office, it is noteworthy that all the constraints were found to operate in the direction 
expected to curb tax evasion in the population as a whole. Those who fear deterrence were 
more likely to comply, as were those who have a strong personal norm of tax honesty, who 
feel personally ashamed at the thought of being involved in tax evasion, and who believe 
that the tax authority can be considered trustworthy providing they abide by shared trust 
norms. Thus, past research findings with regard to constraints has been confirmed. 
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 Third, the adverse effect that additional payments have on the collection of income 
tax is exacerbated among those whose income is low and among those who do not endorse 
trust norms, that is, who do not believe that there is anything the tax office can do to make 
itself trustworthy in their eyes. 
The effect sizes associated with the regression model shown in Table 1 were 
highest for the personal norm of tax honesty.  Moving from the lowest to the highest scores 
on the personal ethic of tax honesty scale brings a reduction in tax evasion of 19.57% 
(once all other variables are controlled).  The next most important variable was making 
additional payments.  Moving from the lowest to the highest scores on this variable 
reduces tax evasion by 14.89% (once all other variables are controlled). Measured in the 
same way, perceived possible trustworthiness of the tax authority scale reduces tax evasion 
by 13.46%. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrates that in some contexts, authorities may be placing the 
collection of income tax revenue at risk by taking on debt collection functions. The debt 
collection functions investigated here were of a particular kind. They involved 
controversial social policy that changed the nature of the relationship between citizens and 
the state. In effect, when introduced just over 10 years ago, the HECS and CSS shifted 
responsibility for support of single parent families and tertiary education students from the 
collective level of the Australian community back to individuals.  A second factor of which 
we need to be mindful in generalizing these results is the contextual effect of income, tax 
brackets and additional payments. As noted earlier, a recent parliamentary inquiry suggests 
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that those with a personal income at the lower end of the $20,000-50,000 tax bracket may 
be having difficulty paying government what they owe for higher education and child 
support because they are struggling to make ends meet8.  
Because of these limiting factors, caution is required in generalizing these findings.  
If we consider other countries with similar collection systems (New Zealand, and more 
recently the United Kingdom in the case of higher education), important differences stand 
out. In New Zealand and the United Kingdom, most people do not need to lodge a tax 
return, and as a result do not have the opportunity to over-claim deductions and omit 
income from their return.  But while these countries are unlikely to encounter the same 
level of taxpayers “fiddling” with their tax contributions, they are not without their 
problems. Bankruptcy rates have risen among those carrying a debt in relation to their 
university fees in Britain (Financial Times 4 February 2003). New Zealand, like Australia, 
has a high incidence of non-repayment (Annual Report: Student Loan Scheme 2003; One 
News 2003), and compliance problems in relation to child support payments (Scoop 2003). 
While the manifestations of non-compliance differ, it does not seem rash to conclude that 
debt repayment through the tax system can be expensive if the scheme is not in accord 
with the democratic will of the people (Braithwaite 2003). 
 The importance of the relationship between citizens and their government becomes 
particularly apparent in the interaction effects found in this study. Non-compliance among 
the economically marginalized is not a new finding.  Non-compliance among those who 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that the situation for graduates with lower incomes is expected to improve because of 
a recent change in the minimum repayment threshold from $24,365 to $30,000 in the 2005-2006 financial 
year. 
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have lost hope that the tax authority can ever be a trustworthy authority is, however, a 
finding that warrants serious consideration and further research. 
 If we were to return to the point of departure for this article, however, it is 
appropriate to acknowledge that in one respect, the adverse consequences of making 
additional payments for tax compliance were not as dramatic as predicted. Specifically, 
there was little evidence of additional payments driving people outside the system in a 
psychological sense.  If this had been the case the interaction terms for all constraint 
variables would have been significant, and when graphed, would have shown a downward 
sloping line for the non-additional payment group (constraint lowering non-compliance) 
and a line parallel to the X-axis for the additional payment group (constraint having no 
effect on compliance whatsoever).  The graph in Figure 1 suggests an alternative 
interpretation: One has to be outside the system already (that is, given up all hope that the 
tax system is worthy of trust; see Braithwaite 2004), for additional payments to adversely 
affect compliance. This means that where the standard mechanisms of social control 
(deterrence, moral obligation, and trustworthiness) are in place, they can be relied upon to 
exert a constraining influence on the increase in non-compliance that may accompany 
additional payments.  
 Bearing in mind the caveats already mentioned in relation to this study, further 
research on the impact of additional payment schemes is to be encouraged. The argument 
that such schemes affect tax evasion in the same way as marginal tax rates cannot be 
completely discounted from the results presented here. Certainly the finding from 
supplementary analyses that the effect of additional payments was not reduced in any way 
after personal income and marginal tax income brackets were controlled suggests that 
 25
increased tax evasion is not simply a response to an effective increase in marginal tax rates. 
The relationship is far more complex. Further research is needed into whether (a) those 
paying HECS and CSS, particularly those who are poor and who have lost all trust in 
government, perceive their payment as an effective increase in marginal tax that has been 
imposed by the state; and whether (b) such a perception triggers heightened feelings of 
unfair treatment compared with others in the population who do not make such payments. 
The findings of this paper have three important implications for tax authorities 
concerned about keeping their voluntary compliance rates high. Debt collection schemes 
through the tax office may be an attractive option for a whole of government approach to 
issues of compliance, but there may be a hidden cost to the tax system itself. Depending on 
the nature of the scheme, individuals making additional payments to the tax office may 
engage in more tax evasion of the standard kind – under-declaring income and over-
claiming deductions.  
The positive news is that the institutions that tax authorities have in place to 
discourage non-compliance, or to phrase it more positively, encourage compliance, work 
equally well for the most part among those who are part of a debt collection program. In 
other words, when policy changes, citizens may protest, but the relationship between 
citizen and the state acts as a protector, ensuring that non-compliance does not spin out of 
control.  
The story, however, changes when there is no workable relationship between the 
citizen and the tax authority. Protest becomes far more damaging, seriously threatening 
compliance when it involves those individuals who have abandoned hope for a trusting 
relationship with their tax authority. In a global world where individuals can so easily step 
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outside their tax system, not only psychologically, but also geographically, the 
implications of substantial numbers of citizens regarding their tax authorities as hopelessly 
untrustworthy are disturbing.  As Frey (1994) has been arguing in recent years, being 
responsive to the democratic will and promoting the integrity of democratic institutions is 
at the heart of strengthening voluntary taxpaying systems in democracies. 
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Table 1. OLS regression results (unstandardized beta coefficients with t-value in parenthesis) predicting tax 
evasion from measures of additional payments, deterrence, personal norm, shame management, and 
trustworthiness (Column 1 reports Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, Column 2 reports Main 
effects Model (A) and Column 3 reports Main effects and Interaction Model (B)) 
 Correlation 
coefficients (minimum 
n = 1355) 
B coefficients (t-values)9 
 
Variables   r Model A Model B 
Intercept  na .42*** (4.82) .39*** (4.46) 
Sex   -.06* -.12*** (-3.51) -.11*** (-3.51) 
Age  -.17*** -.003** (-2.77) -.003** (-2.23) 
Personal income (PI) -.11*** -.003*** (-5.01) -.003*** (-5.01)
Making additional payments  .13*** .17*** ( 3.35) .17*** (3.21) 
Perceived deterrence (PD) -.16*** -.001*** (-3.34) -.000** (-2.85) 
Personal norm of tax honesty (PN) -.26*** -.14*** (-5.68) -.14*** (-5.82) 
Shame acknowledgment (SA) -.19*** -.03 (-1.26) -.03 (-1.53) 
Shame displacement (SD) .12*** .06** (2.63) .05* (2.00) 
Trustworthiness (TW) -.18*** -.12*** (-4.80) -.12*** (-4.67) 
Making additional payments * PD na na -.001 (-.76) 
Making additional payments * PN na na .09 (1.25) 
Making additional payments * SA na na .02 (.37) 
Making additional payments * SD na na .014 (.19) 
Making additional payments * TW na na -.42*** (-4.90) 
Making additional payments * PI na na -.006* (-2.28) 
Adj R square na .14 .17 
***p < .001 **p < .01 * p < .05 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We used listwise regression analysis (N = 1200).  
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Figure 1. The role of trustworthiness of the tax authority in moderating the   
  relationship between making  additional payments and tax evasion 
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Figure 2. The role of personal income in moderating the relationship between making 
  additional payments and tax evasion 
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 APPENDIX 
Deterrence variables 
The deterrence term, in this study, combines information about detection probability, 
sanction probability, and perceived problem of the severity of sanction. It uses two 
scenarios related to tax evasion. The scenarios are: 
1. Imagine yourself in this situation. You have been paid $5000 in cash for work that you 
have done outside your regular job. You don’t declare it on your income tax return. 
2. Imagine yourself in this situation. You have claimed $5000 as work deductions when 
the expenses have nothing to do with work. 
Detection probability was measured by the following question on two scenarios: “What do 
you think the chance are that you will get caught?” (1 = about zero [0%], 2 = about 25%, 3 
= about 50%, 4 = about 75%, 5 = almost certain [100%]).  
Sanction probability was measured by the following four items on two scenarios: “If you 
did get caught, what are the chances that you would have to face the following legal 
consequences? (a) Taken to court + pay a substantial fine + pay the tax you owe with 
interest; (b) taken to court + pay the tax you owe with interest; (c) pay a substantial fine + 
pay the tax you owe with interest; (d) pay the tax you owe with interest” (with the same 
percentage scale for each item).  
Problem of legal sanction was measured by the following four items on two scenarios: 
“Look at these legal consequences again. How much of a problem would they be for you? 
(a)… (b)… (c)… (d)…” (1 = no, 2 = small, 3 = medium, 4 = large).  
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 The deterrence term is calculated as a multiplicative function (the equation was given in an 
earlier section) to ensure that even small differences in ratings on individual items are 
adequately reflected in the overall deterrence score. More importantly, the argument has 
been made that being caught has no deterrence effect unless some negative consequence 
follows, and a negative consequence carries no weight if one is convinced that it is 
impossible to get caught (Braithwaite 2003).  
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SUMMARY 
This paper investigates the relationship between making additional payments to the state 
for student loan (via the Higher Education Contribution Scheme) and child support (via the 
Child Support Scheme) and compliance with tax law. Data are taken from the Community 
Hopes, Fears, and Actions Survey based on a random sample of 2040 individuals. 
Additional payments were found to pose a compliance problem for tax authorities. At the 
same time, this study demonstrated that perceived deterrence, moral obligation and 
possible trustworthiness play significant roles in reducing tax evasion. An important 
finding to emerge from this study is that tax evasion is more likely to accompany 
additional payments when personal income and belief in trust norms are low. The finding 
of greater tax evasion among economically marginalized groups has been demonstrated in 
other contexts, but the adverse effects of becoming irreconcilably socially marginalized 
from legal authority has tended to be both undervalued and under-theorized in the taxation 
compliance literature. 
 
